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CHINA-TAIWAN: UNITED STATES POLICY

COMPLETED ORIGINAL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 18, 1982

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CHINA-TAIWAN: UNITED STATES POLICY

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 18, 1982

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 11:20 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman) presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order.

We meet today to hear from the administration justification of the policy decision, announced yesterday by the President, affecting United States relations with the People's Republic of China and Taiwan.

That policy decision, made public in the form of a communique issued jointly by the authorities in the People's Republic of China and in the United States, essentially pertains to the question of Taiwan. It sets out policies of both countries toward Taiwan.[1]

In light of the obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, this joint communique is understandably causing controversy. Therefore, we have invited an administration spokesman, the Honorable John H. Holdridge, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, to appear today to explain the circumstances that surround this important foreign policy action and to answer questions that the committee members may have.

Frankly, in my opinion the joint communique raises serious questions and concerns.

First, procedurally, the way the communique was negotiated and drafted seems to have violated the spirit if not the letter of the Taiwan Relations Act. That act makes clear United States policy statements on how United States policies would be formulated. It clearly states that the nature and the quantity of the defense materials sold to Taiwan would be determined solely—and I emphasize solely—by the judgment of the U.S. President and the U.S. Congress.

Indeed, many Members of Congress agreed to adopt the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act in the spring of 1979 only with the clear understanding that the People's Republic of China would in no way have veto power over United States decisions affecting Taiwan's security needs and defense equipment requirements.

Yet, the joint communique issued yesterday—almost entirely devoted to matters of great security important to Taiwan—was apparently the product of secret negotiations between the United States and the People's Republic.

[1] The text of the joint communique appears in appendix 1.

Second, the joint communique in substance makes several U.S. policy commitments—for example, to deny a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, to set qualitative and quantitative ceilings on arms sales to Taiwan and, ultimately, to reduce arms sales to Taiwan entirely.

In this regard, the Taiwan Relations Act makes it U.S. policy to accomplish the very opposite, to assure that Taiwan remains eligible to receive U.S. arms of a defensive character and in such quantity so as to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capability.

The joint communique seems to prejudge future security needs of Taiwan, to rule out enhancement if needed for its defensive capability. It seems to leave Taiwan with no better prospect than obtaining obsolete equipment from the United States in progressively smaller amounts.

It was always my impression that the Carter administration, which negotiated the joint communique of January 1, 1979, also envisioned that arms sales would continue with no discriminatory restraint applied to Taiwan, except for the calendar year 1979 during which the security treaty was being terminated and no new arms sales commitments would occur.

This being the case, the decision made public yesterday in Washington and Peking seems to represent a new foreign policy departure. As reported in the press, the People's Republic of China believes, they have really dictated to us and have won their case.

Secretary Holdridge, we look forward to your testimony regarding these concerns. There remains great anxiety about U.S. policy toward Taiwan that this decision only further excites.

We welcome you today and expect your help in explaining the reasoning behind this policy decision and how you expect U.S. policy will be followed in the future. If you will proceed, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me say that I welcome this opportunity to appear before you and to deal with the concerns which you have just expressed to me.

Yesterday, the United States and the People's Republic of China simultaneously issued the joint communique. During the past months, the administration has benefited from consultations with members of this committee on this sensitive subject. I believe you will recall, Mr. Chairman, that I have been in touch with you from time to time, as I have with other members of this committee. So, I would state here that I believe that you have been kept generally apprised of the direction in which we have been going and the issues that have arisen as we have addressed the problems before us.

I am glad to be able to continue our discussion of these issues in a public forum. I would also like to express our appreciation for the way the members of the committee have cooperated with us in maintaining the confidentiality of our discussions with the Chinese; this has been vital and we appreciate it.

As we went into these negotiations, we had two things in mind—our historic obligations to the people of Taiwan and our important and growing relations with the People's Republic of China. Throughout the entire period of our discussions with Beijing we were guided by these dual considerations. It is a fundamental national interest of the United States to preserve and advance its strategic relations with China. At the same time, we have obligations to old friends and we are not going to turn our back on them.

I am glad that we have been able to arrive at a communique with the Chinese that demonstrated their recognition of our determination on this score. Despite the difficulties it obviously causes them, they were willing to join with us in a modus vivendi which will enable us to continue our relationship because of the important interests involved for them. Such an outcome is of vital importance to our national interest. Three administrations before us have worked very hard to establish and expand this relationship, and we would have been derelict if we had not made every effort to find a way around the problem that threatened it.

Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful to take a few minutes to examine the reasons why we value this relationship so highly. One of the major reasons is strategic. Prior to 1971 we had a hostile relationship with China. It was costly. We fought the Chinese in Korea. We almost came to a major war over Quemoy and Matsu. The Chinese worked hand in hand with the Soviets against us in Vietnam. We had to maintain a naval presence between Taiwan and the mainland.

China identified itself with support for guerrilla movements on the soil of many of our allies and friends. Furthermore, a large part of our defense resources was allocated on the premise of a hostile China. Last, and perhaps most important, these 1 billion people were not identified with our interests as we faced the Soviet Union.

Starting in 1971, we have changed this situation. Thanks to a productive relationship between the United States and China, Taiwan has never been more secure and prosperous. We no longer have to plan for China as an enemy.

We can now think about China as a country with which we might cooperate in certain significant areas. China's relations with our allies in Asia have improved. These 1 billion people are cautiously moving into the mainstream of the world's cultural and economic life. Their isolation is dissolving. Trade has increased. Eight thousand Chinese students are now studying in the United States. Investment opportunities are opening and our parallel interests in containing the Soviet Union have been repeatedly reaffirmed.

All of these things represent solid, vital benefits to our security and well-being. Mr. Chairman, we were not going to let these achievements disappear into rancor and hostility if we could possibly avoid it. We went after both of the objectives I mentioned at the outset, and I believe we have succeeded.

Let me now turn to yesterday's communique. The communique reaffirms the fundamental principles which have guided United States-China relations since the inception of the normalization process over 10 years ago. This reaffirmation is significant; it illustrates the strength and the durability of these principles.

On this foundation, the United States established relations with China which have been economically beneficial to us, and which have greatly enhanced our vital strategic interests. At the same time, we have maintained and strengthened our commercial and cultural relations with the people of Taiwan. We have achieved these important goals without impairing the security of the people of Taiwan, and indeed because of these improved relations between China and the United States, Taiwan has never been more secure.

The communique also addresses an issue which was not resolved at the time of normalization of relations—the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. During discussions leading to normalization, China demanded that arms sales be terminated. We refused. I can say here, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that our negotiations almost foundered over this issue.

If you will recall the situation which was in existence at the time of normalization—that was in December 1978—looking behind the scenes I can assure you that the negotiations were most tense and the critical element was the continued insistence on the part of the United States on arms sales to Taiwan. It came within a hair's breadth of a failure, that negotiations process.

China ultimately agreed to proceed with normalization despite this disagreement but reserved the right to raise the issue again. When it did so, we agreed to engage in discussion to determine whether an understanding could be reached. The alternative to our agreeing to hold such discussions would clearly have been the beginning of a process of deterioration in our relations—deterioration that could have led us back toward hostility since the issue itself was volatile and basic. We would have been irresponsible had we allowed such a process to start.

We undertook these discussions, therefore, with the hope that a formula could be found which would permit the continued growth of our relations with China, but also with the firm resolve that there were principles regarding the security of Taiwan which could not be compromised. Those principles, embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act, commit the United States to sell to Taiwan arms necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

Aware of our consistent and firm opposition to the use of force against Taiwan, the Chinese, during these discussions, agreed to state in very strong terms their policy of pursuing a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and described this policy as fundamental. The Chinese insisted, however, that we agree to the ultimate termination of arms sales. We refused because the level of our arms sales must be determined by the needs of Taiwan and we could not agree to a termination date, as the Chinese demanded, which might impair our ability to meet those needs.

At the same time, we recognized that China's peaceful policy bore directly on the defense needs of Taiwan. So long as that policy continued, the threat to Taiwan would be greatly diminished.

As I have just noted, assurances of such a continuity were provided when the Chinese began to describe their peaceful policy on the resolution of the Taiwan question as—as I have just said—fundamental, which contains the connotation of unchanging and long term. We were thus able to consider a policy under which we could limit our arms sales to the levels reached in recent years and

would anticipate a gradual reduction in the level of arms sales. We were not willing, however, to adopt such a course unconditionally.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Secretary, the House is in a rollcall and we will suspend for 15 minutes in order for Members to respond to the rollcall. Excuse us.

[Recess.]

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order. We will resume the testimony from Secretary Holdridge. Mr. Secretary?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will now continue.

I would like to recapitulate. You left just as I was getting down to some of the crucial elements of my statement. So, let me go back just one bit and say that really the beginning of a breakthrough in our series of discussions with the Chinese began when they began to describe their policy of a resolution of the Taiwan question as "fundamental" which contained the connotation of "long term" and "unchanging." And under those circumstances we could begin to contemplate being able to reduce arms sales—as I say again, under those circumstances. We were not willing, however, to adopt such a course unconditionally.

While the Chinese were willing to state their peaceful policy in strong terms, they at first resisted any relationship between that policy and our arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese resisted this relationship because of their view that the sale of arms to Taiwan constitutes an interference in China's internal affairs. We rejected any language to this effect in the communique.

We also stressed that as a matter of fact and law, any adjustments in our arms sales to Taiwan had to be premised on a continuation of China's peaceful policy. We, therefore, maintained—and the Chinese ultimately agreed—that the statement of our policy in paragraph 6 be prefaced by a phrase that related it to the continuation of China's peaceful approach.

This is the genesis and purpose of the phrase, "Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides" which precedes our statements in that paragraph. Thus, our policy is predicated on China's commitment in paragraph 4 to a peaceful approach and our acknowledgment of that approach in paragraph 5.

Let me repeat this for emphasis because this is an extremely important aspect of the joint communique. "Our policy is predicated on China's commitment in paragraph 4 to a peaceful approach and our acknowledgement of that approach in paragraph 5."

Let me summarize the essence of our understanding on this point: China has announced a fundamental policy of pursuing peaceful means to resolve the longstanding dispute between Taiwan and the mainland. Having in mind this policy and the consequent reduction in the military threat to Taiwan, we have stated our intention to reduce arms sales to Taiwan gradually, and said that in quantity and quality we would not go beyond levels established since normalization.

This follows from a literal reading of the communique. While we have no reason to believe that China's policy will change, an inescapable corollary to these mutually interdependent policies is that should China change its policy, we will reassess our policy.

Our guiding principle is now and will continue to be that embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act; the maintenance of a self-defense capability sufficient to meet the military needs of Taiwan, but with the understanding that China's maintenance of a peaceful approach to the Taiwan question will permit gradual reductions in arms sales because, clearly, the need will be reduced.

Questions have been raised concerning whether the wording of the communique adequately conveys the meaning which we ascribe to it. I believe that it does or I would have recommended against its approval.

The present wording evolved from 10 months of intense negotiations in which fundamental principles were at stake on both sides. The language necessarily reflects the difficult compromises which were reached.

We should keep in mind that what we have here is not a treaty or an agreement but a statement of future U.S. policy. We intend to implement this policy in accordance with our understanding of it. I hope I have made that point abundantly clear in my remarks today. I can further assure you that, having participated closely in the negotiations, I am confident that the Chinese are fully cognizant of that understanding.

Returning now to the document itself, let me recapitulate and emphasize a few key features, and then I will be happy to take your questions.

First, the document must be read as a whole since the policies it sets forth are interrelated.

Second, as I have previously noted, the communique contains a strong Chinese statement that its fundemental policy is to seek to resolve the Taiwan question by peaceful means. In this context, I would point out again that the reference to their "fundamental" policy carries the connotation in Chinese of "unchanging and long term."

Third, the U.S. statements concerning future arms sales to Taiwan [paragraph 6] are based on China's statements as to its fundamental peaceful policy for seeking a resolution to the Taiwan question and on the "new situation" created by those statements [paragraph 5].

This situation is new because, for the first time, China has described its peaceful policy toward Taiwan in the terms I have outlined. Thus, our future actions concerning arms sales to Taiwan are premised on a continuation of China's peaceful policy toward a resolution of its differences with Taiwan—our future actions concerning arms sales to Taiwan are premised on a continuation of China's peaceful policy toward a resolution of its differences with Taiwan.

This is indicated by the words at the beginning of paragraph 5 that, "Having in mind the foregoing statements by both sides, the United States Government states * * *." We have no reason to think that the Chinese will change this fundamental policy but if they should, we would, of course, reexamine our position.

Fourth, we did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan and the statements of future U.S. arms sales policy embodied in the communique do not provide either a timeframe for reductions of U.S. arms sales or for their termination. The U.S.

statements are fully consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and we will continue to make appropriate arms sales to Taiwan based on our assessments of their defense needs, as specified by the act. And, of course, as I have just mentioned, if there is a continued peaceful situation maintained by the Chinese, observance of the fundamental policy of peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, the need for arms can diminish.

So much for what is in the actual communique. Over the past several months there has been considerable speculation about the substance of our discussions with the Chinese. As you know, we have not felt free to comment on such speculation while our talks were underway. Therefore, it might be useful at this point to clarify our stand on a number of issues which have surfaced in such speculations.

As to our position on the resolution of the Taiwan problem, we have consistently held that it is a matter to be worked out by the Chinese themselves. Our sole and abiding concern is that any resolution be peaceful. It follows that we see no mediation role for the United States, nor will we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's Republic of China.

I would also call your attention to the fact that there has been no change in our longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan. The communique [paragraph 1] in its opening paragraph simply cites that portion of the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China in which the United States "acknowledged the Chinese position on this issue" that is, that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.

It has been reported in the press that the Chinese at one point suggested that the Taiwan Relations Act be revised. We have no plans to seek any such revisions.

Finally, in paragraph 9 the two sides agree to "maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest." This should be read within the context of paragraphs 8 and 9 which deal with the two sides' desire to advance their bilateral and strategic relations. It should not be read that we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. I hope that addresses your concern, Mr. Chairman, that policy is made in Washington, D.C., by the administration and by the Congress, and not by Beijing.

We hope and expect that this communique, and the step forward which it represents in the resolution of United States-Chinese differences on this issue, will enhance the confidence of the people of Taiwan whose well-being and prosperity continue to be of the utmost importance to us. From the President on down, we have acted in a way which seeks to enhance the future security and prosperity of the people of Taiwan, and I call your attention to the emphasis on this matter in the President's statement which was released simultaneously with the release of the communique yesterday.

Removal of the arms question as a serious issue in United States-China relations will help to insure that both countries can continue to cooperate in mutually shared international objectives, for example, deterring Soviet aggression in East Asia and removal of Viet-

namese troops from Kampuchea. It will ease fears by American friends and allies that the general peace and stability in the Asia/Pacific region could be undermined. By defusing the difficult issue of arms sales we will open the way for an expansion of United States-China relations in a broad range of economic, cultural, scientific, and technological areas as well as in people-to-people contact.

In conclusion, I would like to quote a paragraph from the statement issued by President Reagan yesterday:

> Building a strong and lasting relationship with China has been an important foreign policy goal of four consecutive American administrations. Such a relationship is vital to our long-term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia. It is in the national interest of the United States that this important strategic relationship be advanced. This communique will make that possible, consistent with our obligations to the people of Taiwan.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Holdridge's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman; Members of the Committee:

Yesterday the U.S. and the People's Republic of China simultaneously issued a joint communique. During the past months, the Administration has benefited from consultations with members of this Committee on this sensitive subject. I am glad to be able to continue our discussion of these issues in a public forum. I would also like to express our appreciation for the way the Committee has cooperated with us in maintaining the confidentiality of our discussions with the Chinese; this has been vital, and we appreciate it.

As we went into these negotiations we had two things in mind--our historic obligations to the people of Taiwan and our important and growing relations with the People's Republic of China. Throughout the entire period of our discussions with Beijing we were guided by these dual considerations. It is a fundamental national interest of the United States to preserve and advance its strategic relations with China. At the same time, we have obligations to old friends; and we are not going to turn our back on them.

I am glad that we have been able to arrive at a communique with the Chinese that demonstrated their recognition of our

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determination on this score. Despite the difficulties it obviously causes them, they were willing to join with us in a modus vivendi which will enable us to continue our relationship because of the important interests involved for them. Such an outcome is of vital importance to our national interest. Three administrations before us have worked very hard to establish and expand this relationship, and we would have been derelict if we had not made every effort to find a way around the problem that threatened it.

Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful to take a few minutes to examine the reasons why we value this relationship so highly. One of the major reasons is strategic. Prior to 1971 we had a hostile relationship with China. It was costly. We fought the Chinese in Korea. We almost came to a major war over Quemoy and Matsu. The Chinese worked hand in hand with the Soviets against us in Vietnam. We had to maintain a naval presence between Taiwan and the Mainland. China identified itself with support for guerrilla movements on the soil of many of our allies and friends. Furthermore, a large part of our defense resources were allocated on the premise of a hostile China. Last, and perhaps most important, these one billion people were not identified with our interests as we faced the Soviet Union.

Starting in 1971 we have changed this situation. Thanks to a productive relationship between the United States and China, Taiwan has never been more secure and prosperous. We no longer have to plan for China as an enemy. We can now think about China as a country with which we might cooperate in certain

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significant areas. China's relations with our allies in Asia have improved. These one billion people are cautiously moving into the mainstream of the world's cultural and economic life. Their isolation is dissolving. Trade has increased. Eight thousand Chinese students are now studying in the United States. Investment opportunities are opening and our parallel interests in containing the Soviet Union have been repeatedly reaffirmed.

All of these things represent solid, vital benefits to our security and well-being. Mr. Chairman, we were not going to let these achievements disappear into rancor and hostility if we could possibly avoid it. We went after both of the objectives I mentioned at the outset, and I believe we have succeeded.

Let me now turn to yesterday's communique. The communique reaffirms the fundamental principles which have guided U.S.-China relations since the inception of the normalization process over ten years ago. This reaffirmation is significant; it illustrates the strength and the durability of these principles.

On this foundation, the US established relations with China which have been economically beneficial to us, and which have greatly enhanced our vital strategic interests. At the same time, we have maintained and strengthened our commercial and cultural relations with the people of Taiwan. We have achieved these important goals without impairing the security of the people of Taiwan, and indeed, because of these improved relations between China and the US, Taiwan has never been more

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secure.

The Communique also addresses an issue which was not resolved at the time of normalization of relations -- the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. During discussions leading to normalization, China demanded that arms sales be terminated. We refused. I can say here, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, that our negotiations almost foundered over this issue. China ultimately agreed to proceed with normalization despite this disagreement, but reserved the right to raise this issue again. When it did so, we agreed to engage in discussion to determine whether an understanding could be reached. The alternative to our agreeing to hold such discussions would clearly have been the beginning of a process of deterioration in our relations--deterioration that could have led us back toward hostility since the issue itself was volatile and basic. We would have been irresponsible had we allowed such a process to start.

We undertook these discussions, therefore, with the hope that a formula could be found which would permit the continued growth of our relations with China, but also with the firm resolve that there were principles regarding the security of Taiwan which could not be compromised. Those principles, embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act, commit the U.S. to sell to Taiwan arms necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

Aware of our consistent and firm opposition to the use of force against Taiwan, the Chinese during these discussions agreed to state in very strong terms their policy of pursuing a

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peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and described this policy as "fundamental." The Chinese insisted, however, that we agree to the ultimate termination of arms sales. We refused because the level of our arms sales must be determined by the needs of Taiwan and we could not agree to a termination date, as the Chinese demanded, which might impair our ability to meet those needs.

At the same time, we recognized that China's peaceful policy bore directly on the defense needs of Taiwan. So long as that policy continued, the threat to Taiwan would be greatly diminished. As I have just noted, assurances of such a continuity were provided when the Chinese began to describe their peaceful policy on the resolution of the Taiwan question as, as I have just said, "fundamental," which contains the connotation of unchanging and long-term. We were thus able to consider a policy under which we would limit our arms sales to the levels reached in recent years and would anticipate a gradual reduction of the level of arms sales. We were not willing, however, to adopt such a course unconditionally.

While the Chinese were willing to state their peaceful policy in strong terms, they at first resisted any relationship between that policy and our arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese resisted this relationship because of their view that the sale of arms to Taiwan constitutes an interference in China's internal affairs. We rejected any language to this effect in the communique.

We also stressed that as a matter of fact and law, any adjustments in our arms sales to Taiwan had to be premised on a

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continuation of China's peaceful policy. We therefore maintained, and the Chinese ultimately agreed, that the statement of our policy in paragraph 6 be prefaced by a phrase that related it to the continuation of China's peaceful approach. This is the genesis and purpose of the phrase "Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides" which precedes our statements in that paragraph. Thus, our policy is predicated on China's commitment in paragraph 4 to a peaceful approach and our acknowledgement of that approach in paragraph 5.

Let me summarize the essence of our understanding on this point: China has announced a fundamental policy of pursuing peaceful means to resolve the long-standing dispute between Taiwan and the Mainland. Having in mind this policy and the consequent reduction in the military threat to Taiwan, we have stated our intention to reduce arms sales to Taiwan gradually, and said that in quantity and quality we would not go beyond levels established since normalization. This follows from a literal reading of the communique. While we have no reason to believe that China's policy will change, an inescapable corollary to these mutually interdependent policies is that should that happen, we will reassess ours. Our guiding principle is now and will continue to be that embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act; the maintenance of a self-defense capability sufficient to meet the military needs of Taiwan, but with the understanding that China's maintenance of a peaceful approach to the Taiwan question will permit gradual reductions in arms sales.

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Questions have been raised concerning whether the wording of the communique adequately conveys the meaning which we ascribe to it. I believe that it does or I would have recommended against its approval.

The present wording evolved from 10 months of intense negotiations in which fundamental principles were at stake on both sides. The language necessarily reflects the difficult compromises which were reached.

We should keep in mind that what we have here is not a treaty or agreement, but a statement of future U.S. policy. We intend to implement this policy in accordance with our understanding of it. I hope I have made that point abundantly clear in my remarks today. I can further assure you that, having participated closely in the negotiations, I am confident that the Chinese are fully cognizant of that understanding.

Returning now to the document itself, let me recapitulate and emphasize a few key features; then I'll take your questions.

--First, the document must be read as a whole, since the policies it sets forth are interrelated.

--Second, as I have previously noted, the communique contains a strong Chinese statement that its fundamental policy is to seek to resolve the Taiwan question by peaceful means (Para 4). In this context, I would point out again that the reference to their "fundamental" policy carries the connotation in Chinese of "unchanging and long-term."

--Third, the U.S. statements concerning future arms sales to Taiwan (Para 6) are based on China's statements as to its fundamental peaceful policy for seeking a resolution to the

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Taiwan question and on the "new situation" created by those statements (Para 5). This situation is new because, for the first time, China has described its peaceful policy toward Taiwan in the terms I have outlined. Thus, our future actions concerning arms sales to Taiwan are premised on a continuation of China's peaceful policy toward a resolution of its differences with Taiwan. This is indicated by the words at the beginning of Para 5 that "Having in mind the foregoing statements by both sides, the United States Government states..." We have no reason to think that the Chinese will change this fundamental policy, but if they should we would, of course, reexamine our position.

--Fourth, we did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan and the statements of future US arms sales policy embodied in the Communique do not provide either a time frame for reductions of U.S. arms sales or for their termination. The U.S. statements are fully consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, and we will continue to make appropriate arms sales to Taiwan based on our assessments of their defense needs, as specified by the Act.

So much for what is in the actual communique. Over the past several months, there has been considerable speculation about the substance of our discussions with the Chinese. As you know, we have not felt free to comment on such speculation while our talks were underway. Therefore, it might be useful at this point to clarify our stand on a number of issues which have surfaced in such speculations.

As to our position on the resolution of the Taiwan problem,

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we have consistently held that it is a matter to be worked out by the Chinese themselves. Our sole and abiding concern is that any resolution be peaceful. It follows that we see no mediation role for the U.S. nor will we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

I would also call your attention to the fact that there has been no change in our long-standing position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan. The communique (Para 1) in its opening paragraph simply cites that portion of the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C. in which the U.S. "acknowledged the Chinese position on this issue" (i.e. that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China).

It has been reported in the press that the Chinese at one point suggested that the Taiwan Relations Act be revised. We have no plans to seek any such revisions.

Finally, in Para 9 the two sides agree to "maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest." This should be read within the context of paragraphs 8 and 9, which deal with the two sides' desire to advance their bilateral and strategic relations. It should not be read to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.

We hope and expect that this communique, and the step forward which it represents in the resolution of United States-Chinese differences on this issue, will enhance the confidence of the people of Taiwan, whose well-being and

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prosperity continue to be of the utmost importance to us. From the President on down, we have acted in a way which seeks to enhance the future security and prosperity of the people of Taiwan, and I call your attention to the emphasis on this matter in the President's statement which was released simultaneously with the release of the Communique yesterday.

Removal of the arms question as a serious issue in US-China relations will help to ensure that both countries can continue to cooperate on mutually-shared international objectives, e.g. deterring Soviet aggression in East Asia and removal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. It will ease fears by American friends and allies that the general peace and stability in the Asia/Pacific region could be undermined. By defusing the difficult issue of arms sales, we will open the way for an expansion of U.S.-China relations in a broad range of economic, cultural, scientific and technological areas as well as in people-to-people contact.

In conclusion, I would like to quote a paragraph from the statement issued by President Reagan yesterday:

"Building a strong and lasting relationship with China has been an important foreign policy goal of four consecutive American administrations. Such a relationship is vital to our long-term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia. It is in the national interest of the United States that this important strategic relationship be advanced. This communique will make that possible, consistent with our obligations to the people of Taiwan."

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

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Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Apparently the very basis of this communique is what you described as China's "fundamental" policy. It is your understanding, and hopefully, it will be the case, that they will resolve their differences with Taiwan in a peaceful manner.

You do say repeatedly that "should" there be reason to believe that China's policy will change from what is now the understanding in the communique, we will reassess our policy. How long will it take to reassess and make a determination?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. I would imagine, Mr. Chairman, that such a reassessment could occur quite rapidly.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. On the basis of the track record in the executive branch, in other areas, we wait 6 weeks sometimes.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Well, again, Mr. Chairman, I am quite sure that we would respond in a timely manner to any shift in China's policy.

Let me say again here that we have no reason to believe that China's fundamental policy of peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question would in fact change.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. On the basis of this communique, what is the status of the prospective aircraft sales to Taiwan which were under consideration for several months?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That notification will go to the Congress before the Congress goes into recess. The paperwork is now underway and I would anticipate that the notification could go forward as early as tomorrow.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Now, on the basis of the communique, if it is determined that Taiwan indeed does need certain upgrading of, for example, their communications, or transportation, or indeed some military equipment, would upgrading be possible?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Well, let me say that we are fully confident, Mr. Chairman, that within the provisions of the joint communique and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, we will be capable of meeting Taiwan's needs.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. In paragraph 7 of the joint communique, there is the statement that "the two governments"—meaning the United States and China, the People's Republic of China—"will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough settlement of this issue"; that is, the arms sales issue concerning Taiwan.

What would "conducive conditions" be?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. I would put it in simple terms, Mr. Chairman. We can say that each side will continue to do what it says it is going to do. That is, the Chinese would continue to maintain and pursue their fundamental policy of peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, and we would carry out the policies that we have outlined in paragraph 6.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. And how would you, Mr. Secretary, answer concerns expressed on Taiwan? I am sure there was some reaction. For example, how would you respond to the concerns expressed by Premier Sun that peace proposals from Peking, particularly the nine point proposal, are just other forms of Communist struggle and that they presume that Taiwan is a subordinate provincial government, not an equal negotiating partner?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. I would like to draw your attention, Mr. Chairman, to the fact that we have a distinction between what the Chinese state in paragraph 4, and what we state in paragraph 5. They talk about a policy, a fundamental policy of peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the motherland. We talk about the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.

Our wording was accepted in the joint communique by the Chinese side, so that in effect we are not committed to supporting any particular content of what the People's Republic of China should propose. We look at this, their two statements about their fundamental policy of peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, as we put it, in just those terms. We do not take any position on how the resolution of this dispute should be accomplished.

As I mentioned, we are not trying to put any pressure on Taiwan to do anything or to take any particular position. Our only role in this matter is to maintain that the resolution of the differences should be by peaceful means.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. On page 10 of your statement you say:

> By defusing the difficult issue of arms sales, we will open the way for an expansion of United States-China relations in a broad range of economic, cultural, scientific, and technological areas as well as in people-to-people contact.

Is there any security cooperation implication in the communique?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Well, we did not address the question of security, Mr. Chairman, in the course of our discussions.

You may recall that as of last year we announced a revision in the policy which would permit the Chinese to come to us if they wanted to purchase weaponry. We said that we would consider any such request on a case-by-case basis, and this would be done in conjunction with consultations with the Congress and also taking into account the views expressed by friends and allies.

The ball is still in the Chinese court, they have not responded to this proposal and the matter still rests in limbo. And, as I said, we did not address the question of a security relationship in our discussions leading to the joint communique.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Solarz, chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Holdridge, let me begin, first of all, by paying tribute to you and to your associates in the Department for your successful efforts in resolving these differences which we have had with the People's Republic of China. This is a communique which was not easy to produce, and you worked long and hard at it.

There is in here, I think, a measure of constructive and artful ambiguity which enables us to agree with our Chinese interlocutors about how to deal with these issues at a time when perhaps we do not see fully eye-to-eye, and leave it to time to resolve the remaining differences.

But, I think, it has avoided what could have been a severe crisis in our relationship with the People's Republic of China. As I understand it, it is a communique which is compatible not only with Chinese concerns but with what we believe are our moral and legal

obligations to the people on Taiwan. And to the extent that you have managed to square the circle, I think you are entitled to a commendation for your efforts. I am certainly happy to give you one.

Let me, however, ask you a few questions about the communique that further probe its meaning.

Now, in the communique we commit ourselves, as I understand it, to a "final resolution" of the arms sales issue. I would like to know exactly what we mean by a "final resolution" of the issue. Does that mean that at some point we expect not to be selling any arms at all, or if not, what does it mean?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. The phraseology was not intended to convey an exact meaning, Congressman Solarz. [Laughter.]

Mr. SOLARZ. Neither was the response. [Laughter.]

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. In line with what you have just mentioned about the way the communique was framed, no, this is nonspecific and there is no particular exact meaning to be read into it. There is indeed a variety of different formulae that one might consider in reaching a final solution.

One of these is the resolution by peaceful means of the Taiwan question by the Chinese people themselves.

Mr. SOLARZ. So, the phrase "final resolution" does not apply solely to the question of arms sales. It could apply to the question of a peaceful resolution of differences between Taiwan and the mainland.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That is a possibility. And this phrase also expresses our hope that this issue can ultimately be settled within the context of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue.

It is not possible to predict when or precisely how this will occur.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, is it possible that the phrase "final resolution" could be interpreted to apply only to a resolution of the political differences between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, as distinguished from also applying to the question of arms sales? Or does it necessarily include the question of arms sales as well?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. It is regarded in the context of arms sales. But again, I would like to avoid specificity, if I may.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, in Point No. 6 of the communique we say, "The United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan," and we go on further to say that, "It intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution."

I want to try to get from you a sense of what timeframe we contemplate here. Let me ask that question in the context of a reference that was made by Deng Xiaoping back in January 1979 to a visiting congressional delegation that asked him for his view about how long it would take to achieve the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland.

In response to that question Deng said, "The social system on Taiwan will be decided by the people of Taiwan. Changes might take place in 100 years, or 1,000 years, by which I mean a long time. We will not change the society by force."

So, when Deng Xiaoping was asked in effect how much time it would take to achieve his objectives with respect to Taiwan, he said it would "take 100 or 1,000 years, by which I mean a long time."

In this communique when we say that, "We intend to reduce gradually the sale of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution." Would it be fair to say that we contemplate possibly the same kind of timeframe with respect to a resolution of the arms sales issue that Deng Xiaoping appears to be contemplating with respect to a resolution of the differences between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. It would be possible to make such an assumption, Congressman Solarz. On the other hand, we are not operating under any particular timeframe, and that is one of the points I would like to bring out in connection with the joint communique.

Mr. SOLARZ. But it would be a possible interpretation.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. It would be a possible interpretation.

Mr. SOLARZ. I mean, it could be less than 1,000 years.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. It could be less than 1,000 years.

Mr. SOLARZ. And it could be less than 100 years.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. It could be less than 100 years.

Mr. SOLARZ. But it might take as long as that.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. What we are saying is, we are going to let historical trends be part of the solution of this problem.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I gather that in China, the government there is interpreting the joint communique to mean not just that the United States will end arms sales to Taiwan at some unstated time in the future, but that if that time is not arrived at shortly, there will be another crisis in United States-Chinese relations.

I would like to know whether it is our expectation that this whole question of American arms sales to Taiwan will, in fact, become a periodic point of contention in the relationship—this communique notwithstanding—if we do not cease all arms sales to Taiwan, say within the next several years, assuming no increase in tensions in the region and a continued commitment by the People's Republic of China to peaceful reunification.

Do you think you have laid this to rest indefinitely if not forever, or do you expect that we are going to be having another hearing here as you report to us on the latest effort to resolve tensions in the relations?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. I certainly would not want you to believe that we have swept aside all of our problems with the People's Republic of China over arms sales. However, what we have established is a framework for addressing our differences, and I believe that we can continue to address them in a noncontentious manner.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, what about these reports in the Chinese press that they expect us to end arms sales in the relatively near future? Is that, in fact, what their press is reporting?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Well, I think one would expect that they would take the joint communique and interpret it in ways which would be most favorable to what they would prefer to see.

But, nevertheless, they have joined with us in language which, as I said, is nonspecific as to time and, as I mentioned too just now, while we have not swept away all of the problems, nevertheless we

have established a framework for resolving our differences over a period of time in a noncontentious way.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me just ask you a series of questions that you can answer, I think, "yes" or "no."

Is it true that we have not agreed—even though the Chinese asked us to do so—to a termination date for the sale of arms?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That is true.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Is it true that we have not agreed to consult with the People's Republic of China on the provision of arms to Taiwan?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That is correct.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Is it true that we have not agreed to assume any kind of a mediation role in unification discussions?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That is correct.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Is it true that although the People's Republic of China has asked us to seek changes in the Taiwan Relations Act, that we have not agreed to do so?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. We have not agreed to do so, that is correct.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. And is it also true that we have not agreed to put any kind of pressure on Taiwan to accept any kind of a settlement proposal?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That is correct, as I mentioned in my statement.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. We have talked about the reaction of the People's Republic of China and of Taiwan. Can you give us any idea of what the reaction is of other countries in the area, such as the ASEAN countries? I am thinking of Singapore in particular.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Well, let me say, Congressman Lagomarsino, that when I was with the Vice President on his visit to East Asia in April and May, and then when I went out again with Deputy Secretary Stoessel to the ASEAN post-Ministerial discussions in Singapore, and then on to the ANZUS Council meeting, at every step of the way the senior leaders expressed concern over the possibility that there might be a deterioration or a retrogression in United States relations with China.

While I have not had any comments yet from these various people or have had any quotes from them, nevertheless, I would assume on the basis of what they said before that our ability to reach a balance with China on this issue will come as a matter of great relief to them.

Japan in particular had been concerned, and I can say Prime Minister Frazier of Australia as well. But even our friends and allies in Korea were worried about a setback in United States-China relations.

I think that throughout Asia, no matter what the Asian attitudes might be with respect to their own bilateral relations with China, the fact that we have managed to, I think, stabilize our relationship with Beijing is going to be received with a certain amount of relief, and this will be regarded as maintaining the peaceful environment which generally prevails in East Asia as of this moment.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. One thing that concerns me and a number of my colleagues whom I have heard discuss this are the terms "quali-

tative" and "quantitative" with respect to their usage in the communique.

Now, when we talk about "qualitative" and "quantitative," are we only talking about the announced intention of the People's Republic of China to seek peaceful reunification, or are we also talking about actions that they might take?

Just pulling a few out, for example, the buildup of an amphibious capability, or the acquisition of all-weather fighters which I understand they do not have now.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That is correct, they do not.

That relates to what is contained in paragraph 7, that as of the moment the tensions in the area of the Taiwan Strait, as I mentioned, are at an all-time low. The military dispositions on the part of the People's Republic of China do not appear to be threatening. And I would assume—let me put that in another way, we would expect—very strongly expect—that the People's Republic of China would continue along the lines that I have just discussed, in other words, maintain a low level of tension—in fact, no tension at all—and make sure that military dispositions do not appear to be threatening.

That kind of action we would expect from them. It is not just an acceptance of a statement from them, it means that there are actions connected with that statement to indicate that they are indeed pursuing a fundamental policy of peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Now, the first example I gave you, I think, would be rather obvious, if they started building up an amphibious capability that would directly threaten, perhaps, Taiwan, I think that would be one we could fairly easily measure.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That would indeed cause concern if we saw them developing an amphibious capability.

Let me intersperse one comment here, Congressman Lagomarsino, and that is, my colleague here tells me that the Japanese have now come out with a statement which strongly endorses the joint communique.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Now, the buildup of an all-weather capable aircraft, on the other hand, might be a little more ambiguous.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That would be more ambiguous. It would depend on the nature of the threat as perceived by the Chinese, say, from the Soviet Union and the disposition of their air order of battle in response to that threat.

Aircraft which would be stationed obviously for defense against a Soviet attack would not be in the same league as aircraft stationed at some of the airfields along the Chinese side of the Taiwan Strait.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. But is it accurate, in any event, to say that complying with the Taiwan Relations Act would require that we would continually monitor that situation?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Absolutely. I want to make this very plain that we will continue to monitor the situation, and this means we look at the military capabilities and dispositions. We also look at statements of political intent, we analyze those all the time.

We put those into conjunction with the situation on the Taiwan side, the military strength there, capabilities there, and we make a judgment. We make the judgment of Taiwan's military needs.

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Mr. LAGOMARSINO. And it is accurate to say that even though we have not agreed, at any rate, to sell an advanced aircraft to Taiwan, that that would be something that would be reexamined if the situation should change?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That is correct.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me focus on paragraph 6 again and the phrase about gradual reduction. Now, you say that we will not exceed either qualitative or quantitative terms at the level of those supplied in recent years.

If you look at the foreign military sales in recent years you notice that they have jumped around quite a bit, $227 million in 1981; $488 million in 1980; $553 million in 1979.

Now, what do you mean by the phrase, "supplied in recent years," since you have such a variation in sales?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Well, we are looking at specifically the timeframe since normalization, and this would take into account, then, the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982 up to the present—although we could pick any one of those years, say, as a base year.

As you say, the figures do jump around a good bit. So, what we would take into account would be some of these financial levels. We would also take into account numerical figures. We would take into account capabilities and technological levels.

Mr. HAMILTON. What year are you treating as a base year?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Well, I think we would tend to look more toward 1980 than anything else.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is $488 million in foreign military sales.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. What you see there is actually in FMS channels. There are also sales which went through private contractor channels as well.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, those jump around quite a bit as well, in 1981 it was $66 million; in 1980 it was $57 million, and in 1979 it was $44 million.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. I cannot give you the exact figure, I would have to defer to the Defense Department in that regard. I think that, again, I can look this up for you and give you some figure later on, but I do not have a consolidated figure with me.

Mr. HAMILTON. But what was significant in your response thus far was that you looked at that $488 million as a possible benchmark figure.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. It could be that, or it could be some other figure. We have not really quite determined that yet. But nevertheless, we want to assure you that, as I said before, based on the existing technological levels and based on Taiwan's needs as we judge them, and the requirements under paragraph 6, we are quite confident that Taiwan's needs can be met for the foreseeable future.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, the phrase "gradual reduction," suggests to me that if you were to project the arms sales for the next decade you would see a trend line going down. Is that a fair kind of assumption?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. I think that is a fair comment.

Mr. HAMILTON. It might be irregular at times.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. It might be irregular.

Mr. HAMILTON. It might jump around, but the trend line would be down.

Now, what happens from this point on after this communique is reached, are we able to assume that the arms sales issue, which I know you have had to focus on very heavily, is more or less behind us, and that we can now focus on other aspects of the relationship that are obviously important?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Again, as I told Congressman Solarz, I would not want to assume that the arms sales issue is entirely behind us. I fully expect that we will be hearing from our Chinese friends on this subject from time to time.

But, as I said, I think we can now address it in a noncontentious manner and to put it to a certain extent aside to allow us to address other matters of mutual concern which are really very significant.

Mr. HAMILTON. The reaction of the Taiwanese has been very harsh; is that a fair characterization?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Well, it is a rather interesting thing. The only reaction we have seen so far is a statement issued by the Taiwan authorities, and also we have U.S. press reports. The reaction is about as we would have expected, that certainly in a formal sense strong disapproval is registered.

But I refer to the press comments I saw this morning—you might say moderate reaction and, in fact I believe the descriptive word "surprisingly" was used, "surprisingly moderate."

Mr. HAMILTON. The Wall Street Journal this morning says, "Taiwan immediately denounced the new communique as a trick and a fraud, claiming Peking had duped the United States with its talk of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue."

Is that your definition of "moderate"? [Laughter.]

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. That is words. I can compare the situation today with the situation which existed in 1979 after the signing of the joint communique when there were thousands and thousands of people demonstrating. I think that Warren Christopher can remember that episode with a certain vividness.

We do not see that this time. The situation as we see it, the mood, is far more calm and restrained, certainly, than at the time of normalization.

Mr. HAMILTON. Though their language has been fairly harsh.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Their language is harsh but, as Congressman Lagomarsino noted, they have also on their side taken note of assurances which were conveyed to them at appropriate levels through appropriate channels.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is there any threat to Taiwan, militarily, from a source other than China?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. From a source other than China? No.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to point out some ironies about the communique and address some questions related to those ironies, if I could.

There is obviously a government in Taiwan and a government in Peking. And while we do not recognize the former, there are two

things in common between the two governments. One is that they both hold the "One China" policy, and the other is that neither is democratically elected.

My concern is, as we consult with and make decisions that affect the parties, that we not infringe on the basic human rights of the people, particularly in this case in Taiwan.

In this sense, the Taiwan Relations Act states, "The preservation and enhancement of human rights of all the people in Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States."

Do you think this communique preserves and enhances the human rights of the people of Taiwan, and if so, how?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Certainly it was not primarily addressed at the human rights situation, but I would say I cannot conceive of a way that it would affect adversely the human rights situation on Taiwan. It seems to me to be an apples and oranges situation.

Mr. LEACH. Let me go further. Chinese history in a sense has been characterized by a dichotomy between the ruling classes and the ruled. In both China and Taiwan since 1949 the governments have espoused policies that have in some instances been inconsistent with international and political realities. For example, to think that the people of Taiwan hold as a high priority unification, or that the people of China consider unification a terribly high priority, has not been demonstrated in a democratic way.

In fact, in both cases, the governments' positions on these issues lack a democratic mandate. My question therefore is, as you consult with the governments of the two jurisdictions——

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. We do not consult with the Government of Taiwan, if I may say so, Congressman Leach. We have contacts with the authorities.

Mr. LEACH. With the authorities. We do have contacts with them. Do we also make an effort to assess through our semiofficial offices in Taiwan——

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Unofficial, if you please, sir.

Mr. LEACH. With regard to our semiunofficial offices on Taiwan, have we made an effort to assess the views of the people of Taiwan on this particular communique?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Well, the communique just came out a couple of days ago, or yesterday. So, the views of the people of Taiwan—I am sure we will be hearing from them in a variety of different ways, from our AIT representatives in Taiwan to the press——

Mr. LEACH. Excuse me, maybe I should say the theories behind the communique issues. Did you have an assessment in advance before you went forth with the communique?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Well, we feel in general that maintaining a nontense atmosphere in the area of the Taiwan Strait is a good thing in terms of human rights. That as governments they react more vigorously to what they would call security concerns, responding to security concerns when the atmosphere is tense.

Mr. LEACH. I appreciate that, and that frankly was an answer I was hoping for.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. We think the best assurances, in our judgment, of the security of Taiwan comes through continued good relationship between the United States and China in which China, as it

has said, is carrying out a fundamental policy of peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.

So, that should ease the tension and permit, I should say, a much more relaxed atmosphere in Taiwan.

Mr. LEACH. This communique might be considered an advancement, or refinement, or progression from the Shanghai communique. Do you expect another communique in this area to be the subject of negotiation in the near future? Is this the final communique in this area?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. I fervently hope we will not have another joint communique, Congressman Leach.

Mr. LEACH. I would like to conclude by saying that all Americans have to appreciate the dilemma we are in. There is a fine line between the interests of the United States, which always must be foremost in foreign policy, and our maintenance and concern for various principles and friendships.

I personally think that, based upon the President's strong commitment to Taiwan and based upon the underpinnings of this communique, in essence no change in the status of Taiwan by the use of force will be countenanced. This policy is something that will probably prove acceptable to Congress and the American people.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Thank you very much.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, as far as I am concerned the issuance of this joint communique was a great relief. I was afraid that we were heading into what appeared to be a really unnecessary situation, damaging to our own interests and not really serving any purpose.

I do not see any danger to Taiwan in the immediate future or the middle future—I cannot see ahead 50 years. But my impression of the PRC's attitude on this is that they are very pragmatic and that they are not going to upset this situation. They do not have the capability to do it anyway.

For us to get ourselves in a situation where our good relations with the PRC were threatened—really for no good reason that I could see—just did not make sense. So, I was very relieved at the issuance of the joint communique.

I salute you for your role in it. I think the fact that the negotiations were kept quiet was an intelligent way to do it. I do not know about the degree to which there was consultation. As far as I am concerned, I was not consulted but I am not on that subcommittee and I have no complaint in that regard. I speak of consultation with the Congress.

But I do not see any real trouble ahead unless we manufacture the trouble. I think Taiwan is making enormous strides economically.

The political situation there is not by any means ideal, but I think we have to bear in mind—and I think I refer to what Mr. Leach had in mind—that the one situation that could cause real trouble in our relations with the PRC would be for us to do anything to challenge the idea that Taiwan is a part of China.

If we were ever to move in the direction of saying that the Taiwanese are entitled to self-determination on their own, that

would be very dangerous, I think, for our relations in the whole area.

I do not like to take that position, and I have known some of the Taiwanese spokesmen who feel in a sense that position is a betrayal of their interests. But I think from a larger picture that would be a very dangerous thing for us to do.

So in sum, sir, I commend you and I thank you for your work in this regard.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Thank you very much.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Erdahl?

Mr. ERDAHL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us today. Just a couple of questions and observations.

First of all, the possibility of backing off on arms sales to Taiwan does not particularly trouble me because I think we have the dubious distinction of being the world's arms merchant. If we can back off that, I do not think that is a sign of weakness or a bad policy on our part.

But this may give some signals. I would guess this is where the Taiwanese are most concerned—that this is an indication of a backing off of an understanding, or a commitment, or a relationship, that we have had that goes back for a couple of generations.

If there is a possibility that military sales will be slowed down or cut off, will these be made up with increased purchases and sales in other areas of the Taiwanese economy and with the United States?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Certainly, we have a very flourishing economic relationship with Taiwan. It is, I believe, our sixth largest customer. Our two-way trade is somewhere in the vicinity of around $11 billion. That is a very healthy prospect.

I do not know what we can do as a government to encourage that, but I think the business climate itself is very attractive to many American investors, at least it has been.

At the moment there has been a downturn in the Taiwan economy, I think this is part of the worldwide economic downturn. But given the industriousness of the Taiwan people and the talents that they have, the skills which they can develop by having contacts with us in the educational and technological fields, I have every confidence that our economic ties with Taiwan—of a very fruitful nature both for them and for us—will continue to develop.

Mr. ERDAHL. Just as a comment on that, Mr. Holdridge. I would hope we can do a great deal to encourage it because a lot of it takes place through the private sector in both societies. That we would certainly do nothing to discourage it.

Another question is: How dependent is the security of Taiwan on arms sales? I assume that because we would not be supplying the Taiwanese, obviously they are capable of manufacturing some of their own and can purchase from other countries in the world.

Could you comment on the relative percentage of the arms sales that we as a country have been supplying in the last few years to Taiwan?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. I do not have the exact proportions of what Taiwan can produce for itself versus what we have been providing. But I can say that Taiwan's own capabilities are developing yearly.

That they are becoming increasingly sophisticated. For example, they now produce an aircraft engine on their own. They also are producing an airframe on their own.

Most of the artillery, most of the arms, the small arms, the other things that they need for their military establishment—other than the most technologically advanced, highly technical items—are produced on Taiwan.

Mr. ERDAHL. Thank you.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. In fact, Taiwan is even turning into an arms salesman to a certain extent.

Mr. ERDAHL. You anticipated my next comment because they have been involved in that in some other countries around the world, at least to my awareness.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Thank you, Congressman Erdahl.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Secretary, for just 30 seconds I am going to be the devil's advocate here.

Is this policy change on the part of this administration to be interpreted as a change in the basic foreign policy that has been at least perceived, that is, the United States must be tough on communism wherever and whenever? That we have modified our position, at least this administration has, in the case of the People's Republic of China, is a fundamental change overall?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. On the contrary, Mr. Chairman, I think this is a reaffirmation of a policy that was adopted at the very beginning of this administration.

I think it was on the 19th of March, 1981 in Time magazine that then-Secretary of State Haig addressed this question and pointed out that on the one hand we wanted to maintain and to develop our unofficial relationship with the people of Taiwan, but on the other we wanted to do the same thing, maintain and enhance, develop our strategic relationship—which is an official relationship—with the People's Republic of China. That is based on strategic considerations.

So that there has been no change whatsoever in the policy of this administration regarding this matter. But what we are trying to do now is to preserve the position which was outlined at the beginning of the administration within ways which would not do damage to our own principles or to the principles of China.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. But there is a change from the campaign rhetoric.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. I do not believe I am qualified to comment on that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. You are not aware of what the President said when he was running for President?

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. I think I can recall but, as I say, that is not within my purview to comment upon.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Of course, everybody has the right to change his mind—especially if he is correcting his past position or her past position.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. HOLDRIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee stands adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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APPENDIX 1

UNITED STATES-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF AUGUST 17, 1982

(1) In the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between the United States and China were normalized.

(2) The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper the development of United States-China relations, they have held further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981.

(3) Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding United States-China relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern all aspects of their relations.

(4) The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

(5) The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of United States-China differences over the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan.

(6) Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.

(7) In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an issue rooted in history, the two governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough settlement of this issue.

(8) The development of United States-China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two

sides are determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the governments and peoples of the United States and China.

(9) In order to bring about the healthy development of United States-China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression and expansion, the two governments reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest.

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APPENDIX 2

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON ISSUANCE OF COMMUNIQUE, AUGUST 17, 1982

The US-China Joint Communique issued today embodies a mutually satisfactory means of dealing with the historical question of US arms sales to Taiwan. This document preserves principles on both sides, and will promote the further development of friendly relations between the governments and peoples of the United States and China. It will also contribute to the further reduction of tensions and to lasting peace in the Asia/Pacific region.

Building a strong and lasting relationship with China has been an important foreign policy goal of four consecutive American administrations. Such a relationship is vital to our long-term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia. It is in the national interest of the United States that this important strategic relationship be advanced. This communique will make that possible, consistent with our obligations to the people of Taiwan.

In working toward this successful outcome we have paid particular attention to the needs and interests of the people of Taiwan. My long-standing personal friendship and deep concern for their well-being is steadfast and unchanged. I am committed to maintaining the full range of contacts between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan--cultural, commercial and people-to-people contacts--which are compatible with our unofficial relationship. Such contacts will continue to grow and prosper, and will be conducted with the dignity and honor befitting old friends.

Regarding future U. S. arms sales to Taiwan, our policy, set forth clearly in the communique, is fully consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. Arms sales will continue in accordance with the Act and with the full expectation that the approach of the Chinese government to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful. We attach great significance to the Chinese statement in the communique regarding China's "fundamental" policy; and it is clear from our statements that our future actions will be conducted with this peaceful policy fully in mind. The position of the United States Government has always been clear and consistent in this regard. The Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve. We will not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan in this matter. At the same time, we have an abiding interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful. I shall never waver from this fundamental position.

I am proud, as an American, at the great progress that has been made by the people on Taiwan, over the past three decades, and of the American contribution to that process. I have full faith in the continuation of that process. My Administration, acting through appropriate channels, will continue strongly to foster that development and to contribute to a strong and healthy investment climate, thereby enhancing the well being of the people of Taiwan.

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APPENDIX 3

LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO CHINESE LEADERS, APRIL–MAY, 1982

Letter from President Reagan to Chairman Hu Yaobang

May 3, 1982

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The visit of Vice President Bush to China affords a welcome opportunity to convey my regards to you.

As sovereign nations, our two countries share a common responsibility to promote world peace. We face a grave challenge from the Soviet Union which directly threatens our peoples and complicates the resolution of problems throughout the globe. It is vital that our relations advance and our cooperation be strengthened.

Vice President Bush is visiting China as my personal emissary. He is prepared to discuss a wide range of issues of mutual concern. My sincere hope is that we can achieve, through his discussions, enhanced mutual understanding, at the highest levels of our governments.

Among the issues the Vice President will address is the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan. This remains an area of residual disagreement, as our governments acknowledged at the time of US-China normalization. I believe, so long as we exercise the statesmanship and vision which have characterized our appraoch to differences over the past decade, we will be able to make progress toward the removal of this issue as a point of bilateral contention.

In the meantime, as stated in my recent letters to Vice Chairman Deng and Premier Zhao, the United states will continue to adhere firmly to the positions agreed upon in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Our policy will continue to be based on the principle that there is but one China. We will not permit the unofficial relations between the American people and the Chinese people on Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this principle.

On this basis, and with good faith on both sides, we are confident that a means can be found to resolve current differences and deepen our bilateral and strategic cooperation. It is my hope that you and I will have an opportunity to meet soon. Please accept my best wishes in your efforts to build a secure and modernizing China.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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Letter from President Reagan to Premier Zhao Jiyang

April 5, 1982

Dear Mr. Premier:

The present state of relations between our two countries deeply concerns me. We believe significant deterioration in those relations would serve the interest of neither the United States of America nor the People's Republic of China.

As the late Premier Zhou Enlai said in welcoming President Nixon to China in 1972, "The Chinese People are a great people, and the American People are a great people." We are two strong, sovereign nations sharing many common interests. We both want to build a structure for long-term friendship. We both face a common threat of expanding Soviet power and hegemonsim. History has placed upon us a joint responsibility to deal with this danger.

The differences between us are rooted in the longstanding friendship between the American people and the Chinese people who live on Taiwan. We will welcome and support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In this connection, we appreciate the policies which your government has followed to ~~proved~~ provide a peaceful settlement.

As I told Vice Premier Huang in Washington, we welcome your nine-point initiative.

As I also told the Vice Premier, we expect that in the context of progress toward a peaceful solution, there would naturally be a decrease in the need for arms by Taiwan. Our positions over the past two months have reflected this view. We are prepared, indeed welcome, further exchanges of view in the months to come. I hope you share my conviction that the United States and China should work together to strenghten the prospects for a more peaceful international order. While our interests, and thus our policies, will not always be identical, they are complementary and thus should form a firm basis for cooperation.

In my letter to Vice Chairman Deng, I have suggested that a visit to Beijing by Vice President Bush at the end of April could be a useful step in deepening the understanding between our two countreis. The Vice President will be travelling in Asia at that time, and could visit Beijing if you feel it would be useful

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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Letter from President Reagan to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping

April 5, 1982

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

The establishment of Diplomatic relations between the United States and China was an historic event which improved the prospects for peace and served the interests of both our peoples. Yet we now find ourselves at a difficult juncture in those relations.

I am writing to you because it is important for the leadership of both our countries to resume the broad advance to which you have contributed so much. This is particularly important today, as we face a growing threat from the Soviet Union and its satellite nations throughout the world. Though our interest and thus our policies are not identical, in Afghanistan and Iran, in Southeast Asia, in my own hemisphere, and in the field of nuclear weaponry, your nation and mine face clear and present dangers, and these should impel us toward finding a firm basis for cooperation.

We have come far together in a very short time. I strongly support the continuation of this progress. We must work together to expand the benefits to both our countries. My Administration has taken a number of initiatives to further this process, and we intend to do more.

Clearly, the Taiwan issue had been a most difficult problem between our governments. Nonetheless, vision and statesmanship have enabled us in the past to reduce our differences over this issue while we have built a framework of long-term friendship and cooperation.

The United States firmly adheres to the positions agreed upon in the Joint Communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China. There is only one China. We will not permit the unofficial relations between the American people and the people of Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this principle.

I fully understand and respect the position of your government with regard to the question of arms sales to Taiwan. As you know, our position on this matter was stated in the process of normalization: The United States has an abiding interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.

We fully recognize the significance of the nine-point proposal of September 30, 1981 and the policy set forth by your government as early as January 1, 1979. The decisions and the principles conveyed on my instructions to your government on January 11, 1982 reflect our appreciation of the new situation created by these developments.

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In this spirit, we wish to continue our efforts to resolve our differences and to create a cooperative and enduring bilateral and strategic relationship. China and America are two great nations destined to grow stronger through cooperation, not weaker through division.

In the spirit of deepening the understanding between our two countries, I would like to call your attention to the fact that Vice President Bush will be travelling to East Asia toward the end of April. The Vice President knows and admires you. He is also fully aware of my thinking about the importance of developing stronger relations between our two countries. If it would be helpful, I would be delighted to have the Vice President pay a visit to Beijing, as part of his Asian trip, so that these matters can be discussed directly and personally with you and other key leaders of the People's Republic of China.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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APPENDIX 4

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS OBSERVING SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE ANNIVERSARY, FEBRUARY 1982

TEXT OF LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 28, 1982, FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Dear Mr. Premier:

Ten years ago today the United States of America and the People's Republic of China issued the Shanghai Communique. In the ensuing decade, and particularly since the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries on January 1, 1979, our relations with your government and people have greatly expanded, and our contacts have embraced almost all areas of human endeavor.

Our bilateral ties now encompass trade, banking, maritime affairs, civil aviation, agriculture, educational and scientific exchange, technology transfer and many other fields. Well over one-hundred thousand Americans and Chinese now flow back and forth between the two countries each year, and our relations continue to develop through both people-to-people and diplomatic channels.

These concrete manifestations of good relations between the people of the United States and China are not only in the interests of the two countries. They enhance the prospects for peace and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and beyond.

As we enter the second decade since the issuance of the Shanghai Communique, our desire is to build an even stronger bilateral and strategic framework for long term friendship between our two nations. It is appropriate for me, at this time, to reaffirm the positions agreed to by both sides in the Shanghai Communique and the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China and to declare my government's willingness to work with our counterparts in Beijing to overcome differences and deepen US-China ties.

On behalf of the American people, I extend the hand of friendship and warmest wishes to the government and people of China on this historic anniversary.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Zhao Ziyang,
Premier of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China,
Beijing.

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TEXT OF LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 28, 1982, TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Esteemed Mr. President,

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the issuance of the Joint Communique in Shanghai by the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Chinese government and people and in my own name, our cordial regards and good wishes to Your Excellency and the government and people of the United States.

The Joint Communique issued by China and the United States a decade ago was a historic document, which started the process of normalization of relations between China and the United States and subsequently led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between them. During this period, our two sides have had extensive contacts and exchanges in many fields, thus enhancing the understanding between the governments and deepening the friendship between the peoples. The development of Sino-U.S. relations is not only in the fundamental interests of our two peoples, but also conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole.

Both the Chinese and American peoples hopé that Sino-U.S. relations will continue to move ahead in the years to come. I believe that these relations will continue to develop so long as both governments adhere to the principles jointly established in the Shanghai Communique and the Communique on the Establishment of Sino-U.S. Diplomatic Relations and overcome the obstacles currently existing in the relations between the two countries. The Chinese government is willing to make efforts together with the U.S. government towards this end.

Sincerely,

Zhao Ziyang
Premier of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China
Beijing, February 28, 1982

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APPENDIX 5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, FEBRUARY 1982

EAST ASIA

No Sale of Advanced Aircraft to Taiwan

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JAN. 11, 1982[1]

Since the beginning of this Administration, the President has been conscious of the need to carry forward the unofficial, people-to-people relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and he has expressed on many occasions his personal concern for the continued well-being of the people of Taiwan. This Administration has attached a high value to fulfilling the longstanding policy of the U.S. Government with respect to providing such defense articles as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

Concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, including the Departments of State and Defense and other national security elements, have been addressing the question of Taiwan's defense needs over a period of many months and have taken into careful consideration the many factors which bear on the judgments which must be made in implementing this policy. On the basis of this study, the Administration has already taken steps to sell Taiwan items necessary for self-defense. We anticipate further steps of this sort.

A judgment has also been reached by the concerned agencies on the question of replacement aircraft for Taiwan. Their conclusion is that no sale of advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan is required because no military need for such aircraft exists. Taiwan's defense needs can be met as they arise, and for the foreseeable future, by replacing aging aircraft now in the Taiwan inventory with comparable aircraft and by extension of the F-5E coproduction line in Taiwan. The details have not yet been worked out. The President has approved these recommendations.

[1]Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

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